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This paper shows both theoretically and empirically the importance of bureaucratic quality in
shaping the corporate ﬁnance pattern in diﬀerent countries. It argues that ﬁrm management
under corrupt and interventionist governments is particularly powerful in expropriating out-
side investors because they can threaten to withdraw their government relationship speciﬁc
human capital that is central to ﬁrm survival and growth. The prevalence of concentrated
ownership, relative reliance on bank ﬁnancing and bank ownership of ﬁrms under corrupt
and interventionist governments are various means of overcoming the management expro-
priation. This paper also proposes a new synthesis of the legal and political theories: a
broad-based legal approach.
Keywords: Financial structure, large shareholders, government quality, broad-based legal
approach.
JEL Classiﬁcation Number:G 3 0 ,K 2 2 ,H 1 1 ,P 5 1 .1 Introduction and Overview
International comparison of corporate ﬁnance or corporate governance has been a vibrant re-
search area in recent years. Through various studies, we know that the patterns of corporate
ﬁn a n c ea n dc o r p o r a t ec o n t r o la r eq u i t ed i v e r s ea r o u n dt h ew o r l d . T h er e l a t i v er e l i a n c eo n
bank ﬁnancing and equity markets in raising external ﬁnance and exercising corporate con-
trol varies from country to country. This distinction between bank-based and market-based
ﬁnancial systems constitutes a dominant theme in the international comparison of ﬁnancial
systems. (Allen and Gale, 2000) Recent research shows that the corporate ownership pattern
also diﬀers substantially across countries. Some countries have many widely-held corpora-
tions where the separation between the management and the ownership is a norm, while
in many other countries concentrated ownership prevails where large shareholders control
the ﬁrm management. (La Porta et al 1999a) These kinds of diﬀerence in corporate ﬁnance
pattern prompt us to look for the root that accounts for the variation. One critical angle to
examine this issue is to understand how the variation in government quality helps shape the
diﬀerent patterns of corporate ﬁnance and corporate governance around the world.
Government quality diﬀers across countries. We deﬁne an inferior government as one that
is ineﬃcient and interventionist, namely, a government with high corruption, low bureau-
cratic eﬃciency and counter-market-competition regulations. Government ineﬃciency and
intervention are highly interrelated. In many cases, excessive regulation itself is an endoge-
nous product of corruption because by setting up more regulations, the government oﬃcials
can seek more rents. Under this kind of inferior government, the survival and growth of
business hinges to a large extent on how well they keep a good relationship with the govern-
ment oﬃcials. Casual observations tell us that this kind of situation is widespread around
the world.
Following the resignation of Boris Yeltsin, people realize that a ﬂawed government-
business relationship is a big problem in Russia’s economic transition in the 1990s. “The
biggest ﬂaw was the power which a few tycoons, active in banking, energy and mining, came
to wield over the economy. These oligarchs put Mr.Yeltsin in their debt by ﬁnancing his
1election campaign, but they demanded over greater privileges in return: privatization on
favorable terms, and a virtual tax holiday which starved the exchequer and kept interest
rates high.” (The Economist, January 8-14, 2000, p.25)
In the period of 1960s to 1990s, the South Korean government adopted industrial policy to
boost the development of a few targeted industries. The government guided the large banks
to oﬀer loans to large corporations, “chaebols”, that helped fulﬁll the industrial policy. As
a return, the government also helped maintain the monopoly power of those “chaebols”. In
hindsight, many of these investment projects are ineﬃcient, resulting in an accumulation of
corporate earnings losses and non-performing loans in the banks.
Looking further into the past, we see that an inferior government did deter ﬁnancial
development and growth of ﬁrm. In the 19th century Mexico, “(t)he interventionist and
pervasively arbitrary nature of the institutional environment forced every enterprise, urban
or rural, to operate in a highly politicized manner, using kinship networks, political inﬂuence,
and family prestige to gain privileged access to subsidized credit, to aid various strategems
for recruiting labor, to collect debts or enforce contracts, to evade taxes or circumvent the
courts, and to defend or assert title to land. Success or failure in the economic arena always
depended on the relationship of the producer with political authorities - local oﬃcials for
arranging matters close at hand and the central government of the colony for sympathetic
interpretations of the law and intervention at the local level when conditions required it.
Small enterprise, excluded from the system of corporate privilege and political favor, was
forced to operate in a permanent state of semiclandestiny, always at the margin arbitrary acts
and never protected against the rights of those more powerful.” (North, 1990, pp. 116-117)
Under an inferior government, bribing and lobbying government oﬃcials become the
primary precondition for the survival and growth of a ﬁrm. The illegal nature of corruption
implies that the fewer parties involved in negotiation with the government, the better it would
be to keep the deal secret. It is also easier for a small number of parties to maintain a long-
term and secret relationship. Bribing or lobbying by multiple parties from one corporation
or bank would also incur unnecessary transactions costs. These considerations dictate that it
2is optimal to delegate the task of bribing and lobbying to the ﬁrm management who run the
company on a day-to-day basis. The ﬁrm management thus acquire government-relationship-
speciﬁc human capital, which is vital to the success of the ﬁrm. This adds to the capability
of the ﬁrm management to expropriate outside investors by threatening to withdraw the
government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital, which would worsen corporate governance,
lower economic eﬃciency and shrink the scale of external ﬁnance.
This paper argues that many of the variations in corporate ﬁnance patterns around
the world can be regarded as a natural response to the diﬀerence in government-business
relationship.
Large shareholders are one way of overcoming the agency problem of the management
team. In a widely-held corporation, dispersed shareholders face the classic free-rider problem:
if the shareholder invests time and resources to monitor and improve ﬁrm management, the
beneﬁts will be enjoyed by all shareholders, while the cost lies wholly on that shareholder.
This public good nature of the improvement in corporate governance makes each small
shareholder underinvest in the activity of monitoring or improving ﬁrm management. Large
shareholders can overcome this free-rider problem because they enjoy a large share of the
beneﬁts from the strengthening of the corporate governance. (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) It
is also found that large shareholders usually participate and control corporate management.
(La Porta et al,1999a) The large shareholding by the corporate managers would help align
to some extent the interests of insiders and outsiders, diminishing the loss from management
expropriation, and enhancing eﬃciency. Under more inferior government, the corporate
management’s government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital plays a more essential role in
achieving corporate success and thus it is expected that the potential managerial diversion
would be more serious. A more prevalent and a larger shareholding proportion of large
shareholders are expected for those countries with more inferior governments.
The government-business relationship also sheds light on the choice between bank- and
market-oriented ﬁnancial systems. Raising external funds through the banking system by
taking deposits may be another eﬀective way to constrain management expropriation in an
3economy where ﬁrm management’s government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital plays a
central role. Unlike the dispersed shareholders who tend to underinvest in corporate gover-
nance, debtholders are much less prone to the collective action problem because individual
creditors can in principle obtain the full beneﬁts of their actions for themselves. Debtholders
may independently sue a delinquent borrowing ﬁrm, seizing ﬁrm assets (collateral) or obtain-
ing a judgment against the ﬁrm, while equityholders are subject to collective action problem
in achieving a concerted action in corporate voting. In bank ﬁnancing, the contractual pro-
vision for bank depositors to claim investment on demand and the ﬁrst-come-ﬁrst-served
sequential service arrangement create further credible threat to bank managers’ expropria-
tion of outside depositors (Diamond and Rajan, 1999). This strengthens the resistibility of
small depositors against expropriation from both bank and ﬁrm management.
On the one hand, bank ﬁnancing can help discipline bank managers. Depositors’ bank
run can create a credible threat to the bank managers’ misbehavior that would potentially
harm the depositors’ interests. On the other hand, bank ﬁnancing also disciplines ﬁrm
management. If the ﬁrm management (the entrepreneur) starts expropriation renegotiation,
the bank as the creditor can liquidate the ﬁrm and control ﬁrm assets. It is reasonable to
expect that in bank ﬁnancing both the bank and the entrepreneur can acquire the essential
government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital. The bank therefore could easily remove the
ﬁrm management and ﬁnd another entrepreneur to operate the investment project without
harmful eﬀects to the ﬁrm survival and growth.
Of course this is the ideal situation. It is possible that the incumbent ﬁrm management
might have made management-speciﬁc investment to entrench themselves. Then the ﬁrm
value would decrease in the absence of the incumbent ﬁrm management. To overcome this
kind of holdup problem, it is optimal for banks to own a large share in the ﬁrms and be
active in controlling ﬁrm management so as to achieve synergy between the ﬁrm and the
bank. We thus regard bank’s ownership of ﬁrms as a further measure in overcoming the
agency problem under inferior government so as to enlarge the size of external ﬁnance.
The managerial expropriation is expected to be stronger under more inferior government
4because of the larger role that the government-relationship-speciﬁch u m a nc a p i t a lp l a y si n
ensuring business success. The strength of debt ﬁnancing through bank intermediation and
bank ownership of ﬁrm looms larger in those countries with more inferior governments owing
to their superiority in resisting management expropriation. We therefore expect to see a more
prevalent relative reliance on bank ﬁnancing and bank ownership of ﬁrms in those countries
with inferior governments.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 examines the relationship of this
paper to the literature of political economy of international corporate ﬁnance and law and
ﬁn a n c e ,p o i n t i n go u tt h a tw ec a nh a v eab r o a d - b ased legal approach to international corpo-
rate ﬁnance. Section 3 presents a simple model showing why large shareholder, bank-based
ﬁnancial system and bank ownership of ﬁrms prevail in countries with inferior governments.
Section 4 presents some empirical evidence that supports the predictions of the model. Sec-
tion 5 concludes the paper.
2 A New Synthesis and Relations to the Literature
This paper is a continuation of the growing literature on law and ﬁnance. It is also related
to the emerging literature on the political economy of international corporate ﬁnance, most
akin to Rajan and Zingales (1999) and Roe (2000). Rajan and Zingales focus on the politics
of ﬁnancial market development, especially from a historical perspective. They argue that
decentralization of political power, coupled with an eﬃcient legal system, tends to promote
the development of ﬁnancial markets, whereas the centralization of political power tends
to magnify the interests of those in power who may or may not favor the development of
ﬁnancial markets. Unlike their paper, this paper focuses on how bureaucratic quality, style
of economic management and the resultant government-business relationship would foster
diﬀerent types of corporate ﬁnance. Also instead of focusing on the time-series variation in
the 20th century history, this paper focuses on cross-country comparison using contemporary
data in its empirical analysis.
5Roe (2000) focuses on the political preconditions to achieving the separation between
corporate ownership and control. He compares the continental European social democracies
with the U.S. and ﬁnds that the political environment in social democracies tends to pro-
mote the persistence of large-block shareholding. He argues that because social democracies
press managers to stray away from proﬁt-maximization by succumbing to, for example, em-
ployment stabilization, large shareholding becomes a way to control the managerial agency
costs. Motivated to ﬁght for the equityholder interest by block ownership, large sharehold-
ers would resist more vehemently than pure managers the non-proﬁt-maximizing goals that
the government imposes on the ﬁrm. This paper largely encompasses Roe’s main argument
because social democracies can be treated as a speciﬁc case of interventionist governments.
It is interesting to note that both papers claim that a political thesis is better than a legal
thesis in accounting for the variation in corporate ownership structure across countries and
ﬁnancial market development over time. Roe (2000) even proposes a two-tier synthesis of
the legal and political theories: when corporate law and legal system in general are decrepit,
politics is irrelevant. Public ﬁrms won’t emerge because the system fails to protect minor-
ity shareholders. But once societies have established good corporate institutions, politics
explains better the corporate ownership structure.
This paper provides a new synthesis of the legal and political theories from a diﬀerent
angle. In other words, we propose a broad-based legal approach. As we know, the historically
determined legal origins or legal traditions are essential to the distribution of power between
the State and the private property owners. Common law countries came into existence in
Britain largely as a defense of the interests of the Parliament and property owners against
the regulation and expropriation of the Sovereign. Civil law, in contrast, has developed in
large part as an instrument of the Sovereign to control and expropriate private economic
activity. (La Porta et al, 1999b) The predetermined legal tradition still plays a central
role in shaping today’s legal protection for investors and the current government-business
relationship in diﬀerent countries. As a result, the legal system can cast impact on ﬁnancial
market development and corporate ownership structure through two distinct but related
6avenues.
On the one hand, the legal system, mainly reﬂected in the legal origins, can aﬀect the
degree of de jure legal protection and its enforcement that minority stockholders and creditors
receive in diﬀerent countries, which in turn determines the size of external ﬁnance and the
importance of large block shareholders. As a general rule, the common law countries produce
a stronger investor protection than the civil law countries do, and thus they have larger
external ﬁnancial markets and more dispersed ownership pattern. (La Porta et al, 1998b)
This is the relatively more straightforward channel.
On the other land, as discussed in La Porta et al (1999b) and the empirical part of this
p a p e r ,t h el e g a lo r i g i n sa r eo n ec e n t r a lf o r c ed r i v i n gt h eq u a l i t yo fb u r e a u c r a c ya n dt h e
current government-business relationship around the world. Common law countries tend to
produce a less corrupt, less interventionist and thus more eﬃcient government than civil law
countries do. A healthy government-business relationship would decrease the importance of
and reliance on ownership concentration and bank-oriented ﬁnancial system to strengthen
corporate governance. In this sense, legal tradition determines the quality of government,
through which it further determines the corporate ownership structure and the orientation
of ﬁnancial system. This is a more subtle and circuitous channel.
It is important to point out that these two channels are not totally separated or indepen-
dent. On the contrary, they can reinforce each other. Under more corrupt and intervention-
ist governments, large shareholders and large banks acquire government-relationship-speciﬁc
human capital, through which they can wield their political power to inﬂuence the decision
process of the state/legislature. This will promote the enactment of legal codes in favor of
large shareholders and large banks, a fact that can be testiﬁed by the historical experience of
the evolution of corporate law in some major advanced economies. Pistor et al (2001) look
at several aspects of the evolution of corporate law in the US, UK, Germany and France.
We can reinterpret their factual ﬁndings within our framework.
Among these four advanced economies, the common-law countries (the US and UK) tend
to have a less interventionist government, which in turn promotes dispersed stock ownership
7and a market-based ﬁnancial system, while the civil-law countries (France and Germany)
tend to have a more interventionist government, and as a result contribute to ownership
concentration and a bank-based ﬁnancial structure. It is therefore expected that large share-
holders and large banks would exert a more profound impact on the state/legislature in
France and Germany than in the US and UK.
The ﬁrst example is the appraisal of shareholders’ in-kind contribution. Corporate cap-
ital, including the shareholders’ in-kind contribution, is regarded as a trust fund to protect
creditors. In case of insolvency, whether the in-kind contribution can be re-assessed shows
whether the shareholders are potentially held liable for additional contributions. Countries
with diﬀerent legal traditions show diﬀerent legal responses. In the US and UK, the laws
shield shareholders from the risk of reappraisal so that the valuation of their contributions
could not be challenged by creditors in the future. In France and Germany, a third party or
independent appraisal of in-kind contributions is required, which leaves room for creditors’
challenge on the value of shareholder contribution. This suggests to us that in bank-based
ﬁnancial systems the creditor group dominated by large banks receive more favorable leg-
islative treatment than in countries with market-based ﬁnancial system.
The second example is the par value requirement for share issuance. In Germany, the law
requires that only shares with a minimum par value of DM 100,000 could be issued, which
reﬂects the basic tenet that the publicly traded joint stock company should be reserved for
large corporate undertakings. In the US, however, the issuance of non par value stock has
been allowed since 1917. This clearly shows to us how the large shareholders are favored by
the state and legislature under a more interventionist government in Germany.
The third example concerns the allocation of control rights over authorized stock, pre-
emptive rights, and the repurchase of shares. In the US, the decision on these issues has been
largely delegated to the ﬁrm managers, while in Germany they remain ﬁrmly vested in the
hands of shareholders, especially the large shareholders. This is consistent with our assertion
t h a tl a r g es h a r e h o l d e r se m e r g ea sac o r p o r a t eg o v e r n a n c es c h e m eu n d e rm o r ei n t e r v e n t i o n i s t
governments and they in turn inﬂuence the legal codes through their political power.
8These examples show how the political power of large shareholders and large banks can
promote the enactment of legal codes in their favor.
Our discussion also directs us to another debate in the literature. One popular approach
in characterizing ﬁnancial systems around the world is based on the distinction between
bank-oriented and market-oriented systems by examining the relative reliance of corporate
ﬁnance on bank loans or stock markets. La Porta et al (2000) argue that the legal approach
that focuses on investor protection provides a better account for the variation in ﬁnancial
system across nations than the prevailing theme of bank vis a vis market approach. We can
say that the legal approach is more fundamental than the bank-market approach. The bank-
market approach is largely based on the observation of the existing ﬁnancial institutions. In
fact, the structure and pattern of ﬁnancial institutions are determined in large part by the
government-business relationship and legal system. The broad-based legal approach is more
fundamental than the bank-market approach because as we show in this paper legal tradition
shapes the government-business relationship, which in turn determines the relative reliance
on bank or market ﬁnancing. We therefore can regard the legal approach as one of the
underlying forces that drive the bank vis a vis market distinction.
This paper also links two strands of soft-budget constraint literature. We show that there
is a tendency toward centralization of corporate ﬁnance in countries with inferior govern-
ments. A corrupt and interventionist government tends to produce concentrated ownership
and tends to rely more on bank ﬁnancing rather than equity market ﬁnancing. This cen-
tralization is viewed as a natural response to the potentially severe expropriation problem
of ﬁrm management who takes advantage of their government-relationship-speciﬁch u m a n
capital. The link between centralization of corporate ﬁnance and the inferior government
oﬀers a connection between the two strands of literature on soft budget constraint. Kornai
(1980) and Shleifer and Vishny (1994) discuss how government’s political goals may result in
soft budget constraint. Dewatripont and Maskin (1995) and Bolton and Scharfstein (1996)
mainly focus on how centralized ﬁnancing contributes to the softening of budget constraint
and how decentralized multiple-party ﬁnancing helps harden budget constraint. This paper
9explains why centralized ﬁnancing tends to coexist with corrupt and interventionist gov-
ernment, thereby linking the two strands of soft budget constraint literature. This linkage
seems to be consistent with our observations of the real world. We often see that those less
eﬃcient and more interventionist governments tend to bail out those “too-big-to-fail” bank-
rupt companies and insolvent banks. This kind of bailout can naturally be treated as part of
the protection that those governments provide to the large companies and large banks that
bribe and lobby the government oﬃcials.
3 The Model
3.1 Large Shareholders and the Quality of Government
Suppose there is a ﬁrm ﬁnanced by dispersed shareholders, and the ﬁrm management team
holds a share α of the ﬁrm’s stocks. The ﬁrm is going to take an investment project that
requires a ﬁxed investment of I.
There are two sectors in the economy. One is the protected sector where government
protection is oﬀered to the ﬁrm if the ﬁrm has successfully curried favor with the government
oﬃcials through bribery or lobbying. The other sector is the unprotected sector where
government doesn’t provide protection and support. We assume that the ﬁrm would acquire
monopoly power in the protected sector under the protection of the government, whereas
perfect competition prevails in the unprotected sector.
Due to the secret nature of bribery and the time-consuming process of establishing long-
term relationship between government and business through constant interaction, it is vir-
tually impossible for each and every shareholder to keep contact with the government. Also
each individual dispersed shareholder doesn’t have the incentive to undertake the task of
bribing the government oﬃcials. Outside investors thus would naturally delegate the acqui-
sition of government-speciﬁc skills to the ﬁrm management who runs the business. Because
the maintenance of long-term relationship with government oﬃcials needs constant interac-
10tion concerning business decisions with government oﬃcials, the ﬁrm management is most
likely to be responsible for acquiring the skill.
At date 0, the ﬁrm management needs to decide whether and by how much to bribe the
government oﬃcial. If they don’t bribe the government oﬃcial, they would have to stay in
the unprotected sector, facing stiﬀ competition. The expected revenue is X1 and there is
no expected proﬁt, i.e., the ﬁrm only breaks even so that X1 = I. If they bribe and satisfy
the government oﬃcial, they would end up in the monopoly sector and earn an expected
revenue of X2(k),w h e r ek indicates the quality of government. A higher k corresponds to a
less corrupt, less interventionist and thus better government. We assume that ∂X2
∂k ≤ 0, that
is, X2 is decreasing in the quality of government. In other words, a more inferior government
would grant more protection and help maintain stronger monopoly power to the ﬁrms that
bribe and lobby the government oﬃcial.
At date 0, the ﬁrm management and the government oﬃcial bargain over the amount
of bribery that is necessary for the ﬁrm to obtain government protection. Assume equal
bargaining power for the two parties. Nash bargaining would lead to the two parties equally
dividing the gain in ﬁrm value from obtaining government protection through bribery. The
amount of bribery at date 0 is thus b0 = 1
2(X2(k) − X1). Given that it is proﬁtable for the
ﬁrm to bribe the government oﬃcial and gain government protection, the bribery would be
made and the ﬁrm management does make the ﬁxed investment I.
After bribery is made, the essential government relationship skills are endowed in the ﬁrm
management. The ﬁrm management can commit to contributing his government relationship
skills only in the spot market. These skills cannot be transferred and cannot be bought or
sold. This naturally implies that the managers would bargain over the surplus that is created
when they contribute their human capital.
At date 1, if the managers continue to contribute their human capital, the ﬁrm value
would be X2(k). If the managers withdraw their human capital, the shareholders and the
board of directors could replace the incumbent management with a new management team.
Because the government relationship skills are nontransferable, the new management team
11must make new bribery in order to continue the project as a going concern. When the ﬁrm
rejects to pay bribery, the ﬁrm could no longer stay at the protected sector. We assume that
the nature of the investment project in the protected sector diﬀers from that in the unpro-
tected sector. Since the ﬁxed investment has already been made, when the ﬁrm tries to return
to the unprotected sector, the ﬁrm must liquidate the investment project. The liquidation
value of the ﬁrm is L. We assume that the liquidation is ineﬃcient as L<X 1 <X 2(k).
B e c a u s ei ti se ﬃcient to maintain the ﬁrm as a going concern, the incumbent management
could extract and put under their discretion an amount of funds that equals the amount of
bribery that the ﬁrm has to pay to the government oﬃcial if a new management team is
put in place. Under the assumption of equal bargaining power between ﬁrm management
and government oﬃcials, the amount of new bribery at date 1 should be half of the gain
in ﬁrm value from continuing the investment project through bribery rather than liquidat-
ing the ﬁrm, i.e., b1 = 1
2(X2(k) − L). This is also the amount of funds that the incumbent
management can extract and use for their own private beneﬁts through the threat of not
contributing their government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital. When the incumbent
managers extract this amount of company funds, the shareholders and the board of directors
are indiﬀerent between keeping the incumbent management team and reshuﬄing the man-
agement team. We assume that under this indiﬀerence case, the incumbent management
team would be retained. The shareholders would receive L + 1
2(X2(k) − L)=1
2(X2(k)+L)
from the renegotiation with the incumbent management team.
The ﬁrm management would put the funds extracted, 1
2(X2(k) − L),i n t ot w ot y p e so f
projects. One type is zero-NPV project that incurs no net loss on shareholders, and the
other type is negative-NPV project that yields zero revenue stream.
Assume that at date 1 the ﬁrm management would invest proportion θ of 1
2(X2(k) − L)
into the negative-NPV project. The ﬁrm management obtains a low private beneﬁtf r o mt h e
zero-NPV project, which is normalized to be zero, while they achieve a high private beneﬁt
of B(1
2θ(X2(k) − L)) f r o mt h en e g a t i v e - N P Vp r o j e c t .W ea s s u m et h a tt h i sp r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt
function satisﬁes B(0) = 0,B0 ≥ 0,B00 ≤ 0,B000 ≥ 0, i.e., B is a concave function of the
12amount of funds channeled into the negative-NPV project and the third-order derivative of
this private beneﬁt function is nonnegative. We further assume that this concave function
exhibits the following property: B0(0) > 1 and B0(1
2θ(X2(k) − I)) < 1
2 and B0(1
2(X2(k) −
L)) → 0, that is, the marginal private beneﬁt from the investment in the negative-NPV
project is larger than one for the ﬁrst unit of investment but declines quickly. It will be
equal to zero when all of the extractable funds are channeled into the negative-NPV project.
At date 1, the ﬁrm managers need to decide on the proportion θ of the funds extracted
to be channeled into the project with high private beneﬁt but negative NPV. To ensure that
there is outside investment, the ﬁrm management team would make the outside investors
at least break even from their investment, which constitutes a participation constraint. The
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The ﬁrm management’s problem is to maximize the net gain from this extraction subject
to the constraint that the outside investors can at least break even from their investment.









2θ(X2(k) − L) ≥ I
We can derive the following lemma.
Lemma 1 When the share of ﬁrm management’s stock ownership (α) is suﬃciently large,
the proportion of company funds (θ) that is channeled into the negative-NPV project is declin-
ing in α. If α is too small, θ would not be aﬀected by α. In other words, only when ﬁrm
management is the large controlling or large minority shareholder, management diversion
would be alleviated.
At date 0, the ﬁrm management and outside investors would decide on the proportion
of shares that the ﬁrm management owns after taking into account the eﬀect of manage-
ment ownership on managerial diversion at date 1. They would choose an optimal α that
maximizes the value of the ﬁrm.
13The problem of the ﬁrm value maximization is reduced to
max
α X2(k) − 1
2(X2(k) − X1) − θ[1
2(X2(k) − L)]
As shown in lemma 1, in order to make the management ownership have a deterrent eﬀect
on managerial diversion, α must be at least as large as B0(1
2(X2(k) − I)), which constitutes
the lower limit of ﬁrm management ownership share. It is easy to see that an optimal α
must lie above this threshold level because only beyond the threshold level can management
ownership exert an eﬀect of diminishing θ,w h i c ht u r n so u tt ob eﬁrm value enhancing. Taking
advantage of the deterrent eﬀect of ﬁrm management expropriation, we expect that a higher
share of ﬁrm management ownership in the ﬁrm is required for countries with more corrupt
and interventionist governments, because the amount of ﬁr mv a l u et h a tc a nb ee x t r a c t e db y
the ﬁrm management through threat of withdrawing their government relationship speciﬁc
human capital is higher. We thus have the following conclusion:
Proposition 2 When the management private beneﬁt function B(.) satisﬁes the condition
that for any Y> 0 the magnitude of YB
000(Y ) is larger than that of B
00(Y ), t h es h a r eo fﬁrm
management ownership is higher under more corrupt and more interventionist governments.
It is worth noting that the condition of | YB 000(Y ) |>| B00(Y ) | is not demanding at all.
On the contrary it holds fairly generally. We can easily construct the following numerical
example.
L e tt h ep r i v a t eb e n e ﬁt function be deﬁned as B =3 ( Y +1 )
1
2. We can compute that
B0 = 3
2(Y +1 ) −1
2,B00 = −3
4(Y +1 ) −3
2,B000 = 9
8(Y +1 ) −5
2. It is easy to see that when Y is
suﬃciently larger than 1, we have YB 000 >| B00 | .
I ti sa l s oi m p o r t a n tt on o t et h a to u rs i m p l i ﬁed treatment of large shareholders as par-
ticipating and even controlling ﬁrm management is quite plausible. The empirical evidence
by La Porta et al (1999) shows that at least for family large shareholders, most of them
participate and control the ﬁrm management. Even if the large shareholders don’t directly
control corporate management, we can also easily use the corporate control scheme through
corporate voting (see Shleifer and Vishny, 1986) to show how large shareholders can exert
tremendous impact on ﬁrm management.
143.2 Bank Financing and Equity Financing Under Governments of
Diﬀerent Qualities
We now will extend the model of the previous subsection to the comparison between bank
ﬁnancing and equity ﬁnancing under governments of diﬀerent qualities.
We assume there is an entrepreneur who has an investment project. The entrepreneur
has no funds so that he must turn to outside investors for external ﬁnance. The outside
investors could invest in the form of equity. Unlike the previous section, the entrepreneur
w o u l dn o to w na n yﬁrm shares. In other words, the entrepreneur is a pure manager for the
equity investors. They could also pool their funds and delegate the funds to a bank, which in
turn invests in the ﬁrm. The investment is made at date 0, and it doesn’t generate revenue
until date 2. The investment project is also completed at date 2. Date 1 is an intermediate
date when production is conducted.
There are still two sectors in the economy. If the entrepreneur and the bank successfully
bribe the government oﬃcial, they could enter the protected sector where they would enjoy
monopoly power with the support of government. The expected revenue from the monopoly
s e c t o ra td a t e2i sY2(k,I), where k is, as before, the indicator of government quality, and I is
the investment made. We assume that Y2 is concave in I and is decreasing in k.F u r t h e r m o r e ,
we assume that
∂2Y2(k,I)
∂k∂I ≤ 0, i.e., the higher the government quality (larger k), the smaller
the marginal revenue from the monopoly sector. If the entrepreneur and the bank couldn’t
please the entrepreneur, they would have to remain in the unprotected sector where stiﬀ
competition would drive down the ﬁrm revenue at date 2 to a lower level of Y1(I).
At date 0, the ﬁrm needs to bribe the government oﬃcial to enter the government pro-
tected sector. In the case of equity investment, the outside equityholders would delegate
the task of bribing the government oﬃcials to the entrepreneur. With equal bargaining
power between government oﬃcial and the entrepreneur, the ﬁrm and the government would
equally share the gain from entering the government protected sector through bribery. The
b r i b e r ya td a t e0i st h u sb0 = 1
2[Y2(k,I)−Y1(I)]. After the bribery is made, the government
relationship speciﬁc human capital is endowed in the entrepreneur. The ﬁrm enters the
15monopoly sector with government protection and investment is made.
At date 1, the ﬁrm management may start expropriation renegotiation by threatening
to withdraw their government relationship speciﬁc human capital so as to extract company
earnings. The outside equityholders may accept or refuse to accept this new oﬀer. If they
refuse, they would have to ﬁre the entrepreneur and ﬁnd a new manager. The new manager
would have to pay bribery again to the government oﬃcial. The government could negotiate
the ﬁrm down to its liquidation value (L(I)). We assume L(I) <Y 1(I) <Y 2(k,I). Assuming
equal bargaining power, the new ﬁrm managers have to pay a bribery at date 1 of b1 =
1
2(Y2(k,I)−L(I)). The earnings that the ﬁrm and the equityholders could obtain are L(I)+
1
2(Y2(k,I) − L(I)) = 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I)). Given that replacing the old management team
would incur a new bribery cost, the incumbent management could extract company earnings
from the outside investors up to an amount of 1
2(Y2(k,I)−L(I)),a tw h i c hp o i n tt h eo u t s i d e
equityholders would remain indiﬀerent between accepting the new oﬀer and refusing the
new oﬀer and replacing the ﬁrm management. We assume in the case of indiﬀerence, the
incumbent management would remain. The return that outside equityholders can expect to
obtain from the management at date 2 is thus equal to 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I)).
At date 0, the equityholders rationally expect that for any investment I, they are expected
to obtain 1
2Y2(k,I)+1
2L(I) at date 2. The total amount that could be raised is thus the
expected revenue at date 2 minus the expected bribery they have to pay at date 0 to enter
the monopoly sector. Hence if we make outside investors at least break even, the amount of
funds that could be raised is thus determined by the following equation: 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I))−
1
2(Y2(k,I) − Y1(I)) = 1
2(Y1(I)+L(I)) = I.
We now turn to the case where the investment project is ﬁnanced by the bank and
operated by the entrepreneur. In the beginning, the entrepreneur and the bank coordinate
their eﬀorts to bribe the government oﬃcial at date 0. The amount of bribery at date 0
i st h es a m ea st h a ti nt h ec a s eo fe q u i t yﬁnancing. The diﬀerence is that the government
relationship speciﬁc human capital is now endowed in both the entrepreneur and the bank
manager.
16At date 1, when it is bank ﬁnancing, the fact that the government-relationship-speciﬁc
h u m a nc a p i t a li se n d o w e di nb o t ht h ee n t r e p reneur and the banker helps constrain the
opportunistic behavior of both the entrepreneur and the banker.
If the entrepreneur starts expropriation renegotiation with the bank, the banker can
refuse the expropriation oﬀer and control the ﬁrm assets through liquidation. To avoid
unnecessary complications, we follow Diamond and Rajan (1999) in assuming that the bank
would have claim to the full value of the ﬁrm upon entrepreneur’s initiating expropriation
renegotiation. Getting rid of the entrepreneur, the bank still has the essential government
relationship speciﬁc human capital. It can easily ﬁnd another entrepreneur to operate the
investment project without a need to bribe the government oﬃc i a l sa g a i n .F o rt h et i m eb e i n g ,
we assume that the value of the ﬁrm would not be undermined when the bank replaces the
incumbent management that exhibits opportunistic behavior. Understanding this situation,
the entrepreneur would not initiate expropriation renegotiation in the ﬁrst place.
Banks have fragile ﬁnancial structure as they take demand deposits and make longer
term loans. This also constrains the bank’s expropriation of the outside depositors. If the
bank starts expropriation renegotiation with the outside depositors, there would be a bank
run resulting from collective action problem. As we know, outside depositors don’t have
government relationship speciﬁc human capital. Once the bank expropriates the depositors,
the most that depositors can do is to run the bank and liquidate the bank. Then the
depositors would negotiate directly with the entrepreneur. The most the depositors can force
the entrepreneur to pay out is the amount that they would get if they capture the ﬁrm assets
(or collateral), get rid of the entrepreneur, hire a new manager and bribe the government
oﬃcial again so as to remain in the monopoly sector supported by the government, which
turns out to be equal to 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I)). This is also the market value of the deposits.
Suppose that the entrepreneur and the bank initially raise more than 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I))
from outside depositors. Since the market value of debt (1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I))) is smaller than
the total amount of deposits, each depositor knows that he or she has the risk of not being
able to get back his or her deposit investment once a bank run occurs. Because of the ﬁrst-
17come-ﬁrst-served sequential service nature of the deposit investment, it becomes individually
rational for each depositor to rush to claim the deposits ahead of others. Since market value
of deposit is less than the external ﬁnance raised, the bank would become disintermediated
once a bank run occurs. This threat of disintermediation would help the bank to build up a
precommitment to not expropriating the outside investors. Then bank ﬁnancing may raise
more than the market value of the deposits. (see Diamond and Rajan, 1999 for more detailed
exposition.)
Since bank or entrepreneur could commit to not expropriating the outside deposit in-
vestors in the intermediate date (date 1), the outside depositors could expect to obtain
Y2(k,I) at date 2. This is feasible because when the amount of deposits raised is larger
than the market value of deposits at date 1, the bank would not expropriate depositors in
fear of disintermediation. And because the entrepreneur couldn’t expropriate both the bank
and deposit investors, the depositors would thus earn an expected revenue of Y2(k,I) −
1
2(Y2(k,I)−Y1(I)) = 1
2(Y1(I)+Y2(k,I)). The amount of external ﬁnance that can be raised
from bank ﬁnancing is thus determined by 1
2(Y1(I)+Y2(k,I)) = I.
Comparing the total amount of external ﬁnance that can be raised through these two
channels, we have the following conclusion:
Proposition 3 Bank ﬁnancing can raise a larger amount of external ﬁnance from outside
investors than equity ﬁnancing. And the diﬀerence between the two amounts decreases in the
quality of government.
3.3 Hold-Up Problem and Bank Ownership of Firms
In the previous section that discusses the bank ﬁnancing, we assume that once the entre-
preneur wants to start expropriation renegotiation, the bank can simply capture the ﬁrm’s
assets and ﬁnd another manager to operate the ﬁrm without harming the value of the invest-
ment project. This simpliﬁed assumption ignores two important issues. One is that when
the entrepreneur also has government-relationship-speciﬁc human capital, it may not be so
18easy for the bank to seize the ﬁrm’s assets. Inadequate bankruptcy law allows the entrepre-
neur to manage and control the ﬁrm assets even in the process of bankruptcy. This delay in
seizing ﬁrm assets would decrease dramatically the expected ﬁrm value from the transfer of
control from the entrepreneur to the bank. The other ignored issue is that the entrepreneur
may have made management-speciﬁc investment in the investment project so that in the
absence of the entrepreneur’s human capital, the ﬁrm value in the hands of an alternative
management team would face a big discount. These two discount factors to the ﬁrm value
would diminish the power of banks against the expropriation attempts of the entrepreneur.
Let’s assume that once the entrepreneur starts expropriation renegotiation, the bank
could seize the ﬁrm assets with a value of L(I), which is a concave function of investment I




∂I . Then with equal bargaining power in Nash bargaining, the entrepreneur can expro-
priate an amount of 1
2(Y2(k,I) − L(I)) from the bank. The bank can only expect to obtain
av a l u eo fL(I)+ 1
2(Y2(k,I)−L(I)) = 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I)). Then the amount of external funds
that bank ﬁnancing can raise is determined by 1
2(Y2(k,I)+L(I)) − 1
2(Y2(k,I) − Y1(k,I)) =
1
2(Y1(I)+L(I)) = I. Compared with the amount of external funds raised in the previous
section without taking into account these two concerns, we can easily see that the amount
of external funds that can be raised is lower in this case.
Corollary 4 The amount of external funds that can be raised from bank ﬁnancing is lower
when the entrepreneur can expropriate the bank through her management-speciﬁc investments
or inadequate bankruptcy procedure.
To maximize the total amount of external funds raised, it is better to prevent the en-
trepreneur/management team from conducting expropriation. One way to achieve this is to
have the bank become the large shareholder of the ﬁrm and control the ﬁrm management.
This would achieve synergy between the ﬁrm and the bank. We thus expect that not only
large shareholding in general but also the bank ownership of ﬁr mw o u l db em o r ep r e v a l e n t
under more corrupt and interventionist governments.
194 Some Empirical Evidence
4.1 Predicitons
Our theory mainly has the following predictions:
1. More corrupt and interventionist governments contribute to the prevalence of corpo-
rations that have large shareholders rather than widely-held companies.
2. Companies where ﬁnancial institutions, especially the banks, are large shareholders,
should be more prevalent in countries with more corrupt and interventionist governments.
3. The ownership share of large shareholders in the companies is on average larger under
more corrupt and interventionist governments.
4. In countries with inferior governments, the ﬁnancial system is more likely to be bank-
oriented, where bank credit is the dominant source for external corporate ﬁnance.
4.2 Data
A complete description of the data used in this paper is relegated to the data appendix. It
is worthwhile, however, to note how we measure the quality of government. We use three
indices to evaluate the quality of government in each country.
The ﬁrst index is the corruption index. We use two sources of corruption index. One is
that compiled by the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG), and the other is compiled
by the Transparency International (TI). We use the average of the ICRG-based and the
TI-based corruption index to establish our corruption index. The higher the index value,
the less corruption a country’s government is subject to.
The second index is the government intervention index, which is the average of the two
indexes that investigate how government intervention particularly distorts the microeconomic
activity. One of them describes the extent that countries impose price controls on various
goods and services, and the other of them shows the freedom of businesses and cooperatives
to compete in the marketplace.
20The third index is a comprehensive evaluation of the status of economic freedom in each
country — the index of economic freedom.
The latter two indices are both constructed by the Economic Freedom of the World.
Table 1 gives a summary of the major variables used in this paper.
4.3 Regression Results
1. Government Quality and Large Shareholders
Table 2 shows how government quality aﬀects the proportion of large ﬁrms that are
widely held in the richest countries around the world using the 20% criterion in deﬁning
the existence of a large shareholder. We ﬁr s tl o o ka te a c ho ft h et h r e eg o v e r n m e n tq u a l i t y
indices by controlling for logarithm of GNP and logarithm of GNP per capita. We control
the logarithm of total GNP on the theory that larger economies have larger ﬁrms, which
might have a lower ownership concentration. We control the logarithm of GNP per capita
on the ground that richer countries might have diﬀerent ownership patterns from the poorer
ones. The OLS regression results show that higher government quality is associated with a
larger percentage of widely-held companies among the largest ﬁrms. It is also true that larger
economies have more widely-held companies. There is no clear, signiﬁcant and consistent
linkage between the richness of a country and the prevalence of widely-held companies.
We then add the Gini coeﬃcient on the ground that countries with more unequal income
distribution tends to have higher ownership concentration. The regression results don’t show
any strong and clear connection between the two variables. Adding Gini coeﬃcient doesn’t
change the magnitude and signiﬁcance of the estimated coeﬃcients on government quality
indexes.
I nt a b l e3 ,w ee x a m i n et h er e l a t i o n s h i pb e t w e e nt h eg o v e r n m e n tq u a l i t ya n dt h ep r e v a -
lence of bank-owned companies. The OLS results show a consistent negative relationship
between the two, but it is not very signiﬁcant.
One potential concern with our OLS regressions is the endogeneity of the government
quality index. Particularly, the scarcity of widely-held companies and the prevalence of
21large shareholders may initiate bribery and lobbying so as to deteriorate the quality of gov-
ernment. To address this concern, we adopt an instrumental variable approach. We choose
ethnolinguistic fractionalization, latitude, legal origins and the proportion of population that
are Protestant, Catholic and Muslim as our instrumental variables.
A large ethnolinguistic fractionalization is expected to lead to a weak government. In
ethnically heterogeneous societies, it is common for the ruling group (usually the majority
group) to use government power to repress the ethnic losers (usually the minorities), resulting
in ineﬃcient institutions. Also ethnic heterogeneity would increase the government’s ten-
dency to conduct income and wealth distribution, which undermines the economic eﬃciency.
(see La Porta et al, 1999b)
Latitude may also aﬀect government quality because temperate zones have more produc-
tive agriculture and healthier climates, which has enabled them to develop their economies
and institutions, while countries close to the equator are subject to the epidemic of diseases
and weak agriculture. (see Sachs and Warner, 1997, La Porta et al 1999b)
Legal traditions can be viewed as indicators of the relative power of the State vis a vis
private property owners. In particular, common law emerged from and has developed in
Britain to a large extent as a defense of the Parliament and property owners against the
attempts by the Sovereign to regulate and expropriate them. Civil law (French, German
and Scandinavian legal origins), in contrast, has developed more as an instrument of the
Sovereign for building institutions to outstretch the power of the State and to control the
economic life. Socialist law represents the ultimate control of the economy by the State. (see
La Porta et al, 1999b)
The religions would also aﬀect government and legal institutions. The cultural theo-
ries of institutions state that diﬀerent societies developed diﬀerent cultures, including work
ethic, tolerance, trust and other characteristics of society, that help shape the diﬀerent gov-
ernment and legal institutions. Religions play an important role in shaping the culture.
Compared with the Protest countries, Catholic and Muslim countries have acquired cultures
of intolerance, xenophobia, and closed-mindedness that obviously retarded their economic
22development. (see La Porta et al, 1999b) We thus make use of the proportions of population
in each country that belong to the Protestant, Catholic and Muslim religions as instrumental
variables for the government quality measures.
To have an idea whether the instrumental variables are actually correlated with the gov-
ernment quality in a way we expected, we present in table 9 the regressions of the government
quality indexes on these instruments. As expected, ethnolinguistic fractionalization reduces
the government quality. A higher latitude increases the government quality. The civil law
and socialist legal origin countries generally have a lower government quality compared with
the common law countries. This conﬁrms our argument in section 2 on how legal tradi-
tions determine government quality and exert further impact on the pattern of corporate
ﬁnance. Similarly, Protestant countries tend to exhibit a better government, while Catholic
and Muslim countries show a lower level of government quality.
In table 2, the instrumental variables regressions conﬁrm the results of OLS regressions.
We thus know that the more corrupt and interventionist government does lead to a lower
proportion of widely-held companies.
In table 3, the IV regressions turn out a much stronger result, which shows forcefully
that bank-owned companies are more prevalent under more corrupt and interventionist gov-
ernments.
In table 4, we examine the relationship between government quality and the mean level
of ownership share of large shareholders. The speciﬁcation and the control variables are the
same as those in tables 2 and 3. The regressions show that a lower government quality leads
to a higher average level of share ownership of large shareholders. We apply the same IV
regression methodology to this table, which yield consistent results with the OLS regressions.
In unreported results, we substitute the median level of ownership share of large shareholders
for the mean level and yield qualitatively the same results.
The Hausman tests conducted show that in most cases there is no diﬀerence between
OLS regressions and the IV regressions so that ap r i o r iendogeneity problem should not
be a concern. The overidentifying restriction tests show that the instrumental variables are
23valid.
2. Government Quality and the Bank-oriented vs. Market-oriented Financial Systems.
We use two alternative sets of measures of bank-oriented vs. market-oriented ﬁnancial
systems. One is the qualitative classiﬁcation of bank-based vs. capital-market-based ﬁnancial
systems constructed by Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (1999). They use a number of indicators
on the aggregate size, activity (turnover) and eﬃciency of a country’s respective stock market
and banking system to classify countries into bank-based or market-based ﬁnancial systems.
They use a dummy variable with value 1 for bank-oriented ﬁnancial system. The other set
of measures we use is based on the ratio of the size and activity of the banking system
versus the market system. We ﬁrst use the ratio of stock market capitalization of listed
companies over domestic bank credit, that is, the relative size of stock market vs. bank
credit. As a robustness check, we also use the structure-activity (logarithm of the total stock
t r a d e dr a t i od i v i d e db yt h eb a n kc r e d i tr a t i o )a n dt h es t r u c t u r e - s i z e( l o g a r i t h mo ft h em a r k e t
capitalization ratio divided by the bank credit ratio) variables constructed by Levine (2000)
to indicate the ﬁnancial structure in diﬀerent countries.
In table 5, we run probit regressions to examine the relationship between government
quality and the occurrence of bank-based ﬁnancial system. We control for logarithm of GNP
and logarithm of GNP per capita on the ground that the choice of ﬁnancial system may
be related to the scale of the whole economy and the economic development level. The
regression results show no strong linkage between them. We also control for the average
business income tax rate on the basis of conventional corporate ﬁnance theory that debt has
tax advantage over stocks.
The regression results show consistently that countries with inferior governments are more
likely to adopt a bank-oriented ﬁnancial system. The two stage least squares estimation using
the same instrumental variables as in the previous section conﬁrms the results.
In table 6, we estimate the relationship between the relative size of stock market and bank
credit. The control variables are the same as in table 5. The OLS results produce strong
support that a less corrupt and less interventionist government would increase the relative
24size of the stock market ﬁnancing over bank credit. The instrumental variables regressions
largely conﬁrm the results although they are weaker.
In table 7, we run the similar regressions by using the structure-activity and the structure-
size variables. The higher value these two variables are, the more market-oriented the ﬁnan-
cial structure is in a country. The regression results basically conﬁrm that a less corrupt and
less interventionist government will promote a bank-based ﬁnancial structure.
3. Two Distinct Channels: Legal Codes versus Government-Business Relationship
In section 2, we emphasize that the government-business relationship approach that this
paper focuses on and the legal approach based on the investors’ de jure rights that La Porta et
al (1998) have examined are two distinct channels that shape the corporate ﬁnance patterns
across countries, although they are interrelated. In table 8, we show empirically that these
two channels are indeed distinct.
The empirical strategy we adopt is to introduce into our regressions the de jure rights
index of creditors and minority shareholders — creditor rights index and antidirector rights
index — constructed by La Porta et al (1998) in addition to the government quality indices
t h a tw eh a v eb e e nu s i n gs of a r .I nt a b l e8 ,t h eﬁrst three regressions show that a less corrupt
and less interventionist government does promote dispersed ownership even after we control
for the antidirector rights index that proxies for minority shareholders’ legal rights. We can
obtain similar results for the other measures of the role of large shareholders such as the
mean ownership share of large shareholders.
Regressions 4-6 provide evidence that an inferior government tends to have a bank-
oriented ﬁnancial structure, while a higher value of creditor rights index (better creditor
protection) is more likely to lead to a bank-based ﬁnancial system. When we replace the
creditor rights index with the antidirector rights index, the results for the government quality
indices remain unchanged, while a higher antidirector rights index has some positive eﬀect
on the generation of a bank-oriented ﬁnancial system.
Regressions 7-12 use the alternative measure of ﬁnancial structure – the ratio of stock
market capitalization of listed companies relative to domestic bank credit. In regressions
257-9, we control for the creditor rights index, and ﬁnd that the a high government quality
shows consistent and statistically signiﬁcant positive impact on promoting a market-based
ﬁnancial structure, whereas the creditor rights index remains statistically insigniﬁcant. In
regressions 10-12, we use the diﬀerence between the creditor rights index and the antidirector
rights index to measure the bias of legal protection toward creditors rather than minority
shareholders. We see that the government quality indices continue to exert a positive impact
on the occurrence of a market-oriented ﬁnancial system and remain statistically signiﬁcant.
The diﬀerence in the two investor rights indexes doesn’t produce a statistically signiﬁcant
result.
These results suggest that the government-business relationship is truly a distinct channel
that helps shape the corporate ﬁnance pattern around the world.
5C o n c l u s i o n
This paper points out the importance of bureaucratic quality in shaping the pattern of
corporate ﬁnance across countries. Firm management under corrupt and interventionist
governments is particularly powerful in expropriating outside investors because they can
threaten to withdraw their acquired government relationship speciﬁc human capital that is
vital to ﬁrm survival and growth. The prevalence of large shareholders, relative reliance on
bank ﬁnancing and bank ownership of ﬁrms are various means of constraining managerial
expropriation under corrupt and interventionist governments. Both theoretically and empir-
ically, this paper shows that the variation in government-business relationship is a signiﬁcant
driving force of the diverse pattern of corporate ﬁnance around the world.
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[proof of Lemma] The participation constraint can be reduced to 0 ≤ θ ≤
X2(k)−I
X2(k)−L.
The ﬁrst order condition is
F = B0[1
2(X2(k) − L)] − α[1
2(X2(k) − L)] = B0 − α =0 .
Since by assumption B0(0) > 1, we see that F |θ=0= B0(0) − α > 0. This implies that
θ =0is not the optimal equilibrium.
When θ =
X2(k)−I
X2(k)−L, that is, the shareholders’ participation constraint is binding, F be-
comes B0(1
2(X2(k)−I))−α. It is obvious that when α is very small so that B0(1
2(X2(k)−I)) ≥
α, the management team will divert the maximum proportion of funds into the negative-
NPV project, that is, θ =
X2(k)−I
X2(k)−L will be the equilibrium choice. When α is suﬃciently
large so that B0(1
2(X2(k)−I)) < α, the equilibrium proportion of θ will be less than
X2(k)−I
X2(k)−L,
i.e., the investors’ participation constraint won’t be binding. Only when θ <
X2(k)−I
X2(k)−L, the
ownership share of ﬁrm management would play a role in constraining managerial diversion.
T a k i n gt h ed e r i v a t i v eo fF with respect to θ and α, respectively, we have
Fθ = B00[1
2(X2(k) − L)] ≤ 0, and Fα = −1.





For future use, we also derive Fk = B00[1
2θX0







X2(k)−L ≥ 0. QED.
[proof of Proposition 1] Consider any α that is above the threshold level of B0(1
2(X2(k)−
I)). The ﬁrst order condition is G = − ∂θ
∂α[1
2(X2(k) − L)] = 0. Taking the ﬁrst derivative of
G with respect to k,w eh a v eGk = − ∂2θ
∂α∂k[1













When the condition | B000[1
2θ(X2(k) − L)] |≥| B00 | holds, we have ∂2θ
∂α∂k ≥ 0 and thus
Gk ≤ 0.











2(X2(k)−L)]2 ≥ 0 because ∂θ
∂α ≤ 0. Hence Gα ≤ 0.
Using the implicit function theorem, we have ∂α
∂k = −
Gk
Gα ≤ 0. QED.




2L0 =1 , while the amount of external investment in bank ﬁnancing




1 =1 . Because L0 <Y 0
2 for the same I,w eh a v eI1 <I 2.
Because
∂2Y2(k,I)
∂k∂I ≤ 0, that is, the higher government quality (the bigger k), the smaller the
m a r g i n a lr e v e n u ef r o mt h em o n o p o l ys e c t o r ,w eh a v et h a tr e l a t i v et oI1,I 2 would be smaller
for countries with higher government quality and bigger for countries with lower government
quality. This implies that the gap in the amount of external ﬁnance raised through bank
and equity ﬁnancing is increasing in the weakness of government quality. QED.
[proof of Corollary] The amount of funds (I3) t h a tc a nb er a i s e di nt h ec a s ew h e r e
entrepreneur can expropriate is determined by 1
2(Y1(I)+L(I)) = I.T h eﬁrst order condition
is 1
2(Y 0
1(I)+L0(I)) = 1. In the case where the entrepreneur cannot expropriate, the amount




∂I )=I.Since Y1,Y 2,




∂I , we know that I3 >I 2. QED.
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